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SHARING HIMALAYAN GLACIAL 
MELTWATER: THE ROLE OF TERRITORIAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
ERICA J. THORSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mountain glaciers around the world are melting.1 The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the World Glacier 
Monitoring Service both predict that the Andean and Himalayan 
glaciers, sources of freshwater for millions of people, will retreat 
irreversibly in the coming decades, forever releasing their savings 
accounts of freshwater.2 Glacial retreat portends significant global 
justice consequences: seventy-seven percent of the world’s freshwater 
resources is stored in ice—either in the polar ice caps or mountain 
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 1. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 493 (2007) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007] (warning that Himalayan glaciers could disappear by 2035 if they continue retreating at 
their present rates); UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM & WORLD GLACIER 
MONITORING SERVICE, GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGES: FACTS AND FIGURES 29 (n.d.), 
http://www.grid.unep.ch/glaciers/pdfs/glaciers.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGES] 
(warning that current climate changes could lead to the disappearance of glaciers in many 
mountain ranges in the next few decades); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND NEPAL PROGRAM, AN 
OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, GLACIER RETREAT, AND SUBSEQUENT IMPACTS IN NEPAL, INDIA 
AND CHINA 1-2 (2005), available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/himalayaglaciersreport 
2005.pdf  [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS] (discussing the effects of climate change on 
alpine glaciers); David Adam, Water for Millions at Risk as Glaciers Melt Away, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 11, 2006, at 13, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/ 
2006/oct/11/glaciers.travelnews; Richard Black, Water – Another Global “Crisis”?, BBC NEWS, 
Feb. 2, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7865603.stm (graphing glacier 
melt by region, using data collected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 
 2. WORKING GROUP II TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER 28 (2008), available at http:// 
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/climate-change-water-en.pdf; GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGES, 
supra note 1, at 29. 
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glaciers.3 While the polar ice caps store most of the water, mountain 
glaciers nonetheless bank a portion that is significant, not just in 
quantity but also in accessibility.  In light of the extreme freshwater 
shortages experts predict, glacial water is of extraordinary value and 
waste of this resource is to humanity’s peril.4 
A close examination of the Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin 
highlights starkly the importance of glacial meltwater to the 
Himalayan region; it also underscores the complex security concerns 
and water justice issues so pervasive in Himalayan region politics.5 
The Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin significantly depends on 
glaciers as a primary source of freshwater, including slightly over 
11,000 glaciers resting in Nepal, India, the Tibetan plateau, and 
Bhutan. The vast majority of these glaciers rest in Chinese territory.6 
These glaciers supply water for Nepal, India, China, Bhutan, and 
Bangladesh.7 Aside from feeding the many rivers and lakes of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin with year-round fresh water, the 
11,000 glaciers comprise 2,571.8 cubic kilometers of ice or 617 cubic 
 
 3. The oceans store over 97% of the world’s water; glaciers and ice caps store only 2% of 
the total water supply, but 77% of the world’s freshwater. PETER G. KNIGHT, GLACIERS 12 
(1999). Although much of this freshwater is locked away in polar ice caps and glaciers, mountain 
glaciers account for 0.12% of the world’s freshwater. UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE 68 (2003), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr1/. In comparison, rivers account for just 0.006% 
of the world’s freshwater. Id. 
 4. OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 3 (estimating that reduced water flows in the 
Ganges caused by lost glacial meltwater could lead to water shortages for 500 million people 
and 37% of India’s irrigated land). 
 5. Regarding water conflicts and water security in the region, see generally Surya P. 
Subedi, Conclusions and Recommendations, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR 
THE 21ST  CENTURY: THE CASE OF THE RIVER GANGES BASIN 247, 247-50 (Surya P. Subedi ed., 
2005) (describing the lack of a cohesive approach to water management in the region and 
lamenting the lack of “foresight and wisdom to achieve meaningful cooperation in the area”); 
B.C. UPRETI, POLITICS OF HIMALAYAN RIVER WATERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIVER WATER 
ISSUES OF NEPAL, INDIA, AND BANGLADESH (1993) (outlining the challenges facing the 
Himalayan region regarding multilateral riparian cooperation); Shawkat Alam, An Examination 
of the International Environmental Law Governing the Proposed Indian River-Linking Project 
and an Appraisal of its Ecological and Socio-Economic Implications for Lower Riparian 
Countries, 19 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (2007) (exploring the conflict between 
Bangladesh and India over the proposed project); Salman M.A. Salman & Kishor Uprety, 
Hydro-politics in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties, 
39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 295 (1999) (discussing the water politics of India, Nepal, and 
Bangladesh). 
 6. MAP OF GLACIER RESOURCES IN THE HIMALAYAS 7-1-7-7 (Qin Dahe ed., 1999). 
 7. Id. at 7-1. 
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miles of frozen water—water that scientists predict the glaciers will 
soon release.8 
Although artificially inducing the retreat of glaciers may not be 
ecologically or climatologically wise, the Himalayan region 
nonetheless has an interest in storing glacial meltwater that 
represents the amount of glacial melt in excess of historic levels.9 
First, the region is heavily reliant on the Himalayan rivers for much of 
its freshwater needs, including sanitation, drinking water, agricultural 
and industrial development, and hydroelectricity.10 Thus, diversion 
and storage of the water is a rational choice—it would allow the 
region to maximize the beneficial uses of the water.11 Second, 
diversion and storage would forestall the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of glacial melt, such as glacial lake outburst floods and 
sea-level rise, which threaten many low-lying States—in particular 
Bangladesh, a country that depends on Himalayan glacial meltwater 
as a main freshwater source.12 
The States most well-positioned, inclined, and capable of water 
storage projects of such tremendous capacity are likely to be the 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. While the supply of water will initially increase with rising temperatures, as frozen 
water storage melts away, these supplies will disappear, too. XU JIANCHU ET AL., THE MELTING 
HIMALAYAS: REGIONAL CHALLENGES AND LOCAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON 
MOUNTAIN ECOSYSTEMS AND LIVELIHOODS 7 (2007). Combined with population growth and 
increased water consumption, climate change could lead to calamitous water shortages in the 
region by 2050. Id. 
 10. BHIM SUBBA, HIMALAYAN WATERS: PROMISE AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND 
POLITICS 87 (2001) (explaining the uses and stresses on water resources in the region); see also 
OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing the consequences of decreased water 
flows in Nepal); Sumit Ganguly & Manjeet S. Pardesi, India Rising: What is New Delhi to Do?, 
24 WORLD POL’Y J. 9, 14 (2007) (describing India’s current water challenges). 
 11. SUBBA, supra note 10, at 171 (identifying possible uses of stored water). 
 12. While the plains face the threat of an increase the frequency and severity of floods 
caused by glacial melt, the more serious threats are in the mountains. OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, 
supra note 1, at 3-4. As glaciers retreat, they leave behind depressions and moraine deposits, 
where glacial lakes can form. These lakes are prone to bursting; the resulting glacial lake 
outburst flood (GLOF) carries with it not just water but also moraine deposits, wreaking havoc 
on downstream communities and infrastructure. Id. For a detailed explanation of GLOFs, see 
MICHAEL HAMBREY & JÜRG ALEAN, GLACIERS 253-69 (2d ed. 2004). See also SAMJWAL 
RATNA BAJRACHARYA, PRADEEP KUMAR MOOL & BASANTA RAJ SHRESTHA, IMPACT OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE ON HIMALAYAN GLACIERS AND GLACIAL LAKES: CASE STUDIES ON 
GLOF AND ASSOCIATED HAZARDS IN NEPAL AND BHUTAN 3-4 (2007) available at 
http://books.icimod.org/index.php/downloads/publication/169 (recounting past GLOFs in the 
region). Sea level rise carries with it many hazards, including increased flooding, coastal erosion, 
and increased salinization of groundwater supplies. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 48-49 (2007) available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT 2007]. 
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wealthier upper riparian States.13 This raises a number of interesting 
and important questions: Does the water, and all rights to benefit 
from the water, belong to the upper riparian States where the glaciers 
currently rest? Or, because the glacial meltwater would otherwise run 
its course through an interconnected, transboundary water system, do 
lower riparian States also have rights vis-à-vis that glacial meltwater? 
Unless international law, either customary or treaty, provides 
downstream or otherwise interconnected States with rights vis-à-vis 
glacial meltwater and, conversely, imposes duties on upper riparian 
States, downstream States are at the mercy of seasonal rivers, lakes, 
and aquifers. 
This brief article begins to explore the theoretical underpinnings 
of the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses in 
light of the imminent significance of glaciers as controversial 
international natural resources. This article critically assesses the 
scope of the law, specifically whether the Himalayan glaciers that feed 
the major river basins of the region are included within the scope of 
the law.  Specific substantive rights and duties aside, consideration of 
whether the law is adequate in scope is germane to understanding 
whether the law of international watercourses is a good framework 
under which States should deliberate and cooperate regarding glacial 
meltwater issues. 
Part I of this article describes the basic glacier formation and 
decay processes and the characteristics that give glaciers an 
international dimension. Part II considers the foundational property-
based tenets of the law of international watercourses, emphasizing the 
role of territorial sovereignty, even as a limited territorial sovereignty 
approach currently reigns. Part III examines whether mountain 
glaciers that exhibit certain international characteristics are subject to 
international watercourse law. The article concludes that the precept 
of territorial sovereignty heavily influences our current understanding 
of the law of international watercourses, and leads to a restricted 
scope of the law. Thus, as currently understood, the law of non-
navigational uses of international watercourses engenders an 
insufficient identification of important international glaciers and 
 
 13. China accounts for almost half of all large dams in the world, with over 22,000; India 
also ranks in the top five, with over 4,000. WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND 
DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 9 (2000) available at 
http://www.dams.org/report/. In contrast, just 1% of irrigation water in Nepal and Bangladesh 
comes from dams. Id. at 13. 
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therefore likely fails to provide an adequate framework for redressing 
the concerns of downstream States, such as Bangladesh. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON GLACIERS 
A. Basic Overview of Glaciers 
Glaciers form from highly compacted snow, often at the base of 
mountains.14 When snow falls at a greater rate than it melts, a portion 
of the snow remains throughout the year.15 Then, when new snow 
falls, it densely packs the snow remaining on the ground, hardening 
and insulating it.16 As this process repeats itself over a series of years, 
the base layers of snow transform into ice and form a glacier.17 
As glaciers age, they grow and retreat simultaneously. Glaciers 
melt throughout the year, even as snow accumulates. In summer, 
warmer air temperatures and solar radiation melt the surface of the 
glaciers, while the pressure of amassing ice and geothermal activity 
cause the base of the glacier to melt even in winter.18 Melting glacial 
ice moves through the glacier in several ways. Some of this melting 
ice travels unobstructed to the glacier’s snout through surface 
streams, internal channels, and along the glacier bed.19 In other cases, 
snow and ice dams temporarily trap some water either on the surface 
of the glacier, within the glacier, or along the glacier bed, storing it 
until the dam breaks.20 Other water remains in deep slush at the edge 
of the glacier and in the ground beneath the glacier.21 
This complex drainage system makes tracking glacial meltwater 
difficult.22 As global temperatures rise and glaciers melt faster, this 
meltwater will become increasingly important. Initially, glacial retreat 
is likely to flood riverbeds with water as more water than the glaciers 
otherwise supply is released; following that, however, the absence of 
the glaciers portends dry river beds except as rain or snowfall may 
 
 14. SUBBA, supra note 10, at 42-43. 
 15. Id. at 42. 
 16. HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 25-27. 
 17. Id. 
 18. SUBBA, supra note 10, at 46-47. 
 19. HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 122. 
 20. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 95-96. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 127. 
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supply water.23 This means less freshwater storage, more potentially 
catastrophic floods from glacial lakes, and economic losses from 
industries reliant on a constant supply of water.24 
B. The International Nature of Glaciers 
Those glaciers that may be considered international and their 
meltwater can be generally thought of in two categories for legal 
purposes—transboundary glaciers, those that straddle international 
borders, and glaciers that exist entirely within a single State’s 
territory. Either of these types of glaciers could be an international 
glacier. First, a glacier and its meltwater may be transboundary either 
because the glacier itself straddles an international boundary or 
because its meltwater traverses one or more international borders. 
The Siachen glacier is an example of the former scenario. Five of the 
six largest glaciers outside of the polar regions reside in the 
Karakoram Range, which spans Pakistan, India and China.25 The 
largest of these glaciers, the Siachen Glacier, is seventy-five 
kilometers long, stretches over 450 square kilometers, and extends 
across the border between India and Pakistan.26 In fact, the Siachen 
glacier may be a harbinger of what is to come—India and Pakistan 
have been warring over this territory since 1984, but not necessarily 
out of concern for freshwater resources.27 Although the Siachen 
glacier feeds the Indus River, which is indisputedly a transboundary 
river,28 one could imagine a scenario in which a transboundary glacier 
 
 23. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 208-09 (2001); OVERVIEW OF 
GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 3; Fred Pearce, Flooded Out, NEW SCIENTIST, June 5, 1999. 
 24. OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 3-4 (enumerating adverse consequences of 
glacial melt). 
 25. SUBBA, supra note 10, at 45. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Neal A. Kemkar, Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict Between India and 
Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier Through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace Park, 25 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 67, 77-78 (2006). This territorial dispute dates back to partition, when India and 
Pakistan agreed on a cease-fire line up to the glacier, leaving the status of the glacier itself 
unclear. Id. at 75-76. However, India claims ownership over the territory in part because the 
glacier is the source of the Nubra River, which flows through India before joining the Indus. See 
id. at 77. See also Tim McGirk with Avarind Adiga, War at the Top of the World, TIMEASIA, 
May 4, 2005, available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501050711/story.html (reviewing 
the history of the dispute and the current situation). 
 28. Kemkar, supra note 27, at 77. 
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did not feed an international water body, instead melting into a 
confined, subglacial lake.29 
As an example of the latter scenario, a glacier wholly within the 
sovereign territory of one State could melt in such a way as to create a 
glacial lake that crosses an international border, or such a glacier 
could melt and feed a shared aquifer, giving the glacier’s meltwater an 
international, transboundary character.30 These situations clearly give 
rise to an international water resource because it is clearly established 
that a water resource that either traverses or carves an international 
border is an internationalized water resource.31 Additionally, a glacier 
that rests wholly within the sovereign territory of a single State may 
feed a river or lake as part of a watershed that extends beyond a 
single State’s borders.32 Many glaciers feed rivers in neighboring 
countries, giving them an indisputably international character. For 
example, the East, Central and West Rongbuk Glaciers at the base of 
Mount Everest in Tibet flow into the Rong River, which then flows 
into Nepal’s Arun River.33 Tibet’s Pumori Glacier also flows to the 
Arun River via the Rong River, while the Kangshung Glacier drains 
into the Arun through the Kama River.34 As these examples 
demonstrate, it is easy to conjure examples of glacial water exhibiting 
some international character. 
III.  THE EVOLVING ROLE OF TERRITORIAL 
SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE LAW 
International watercourse law is predicated on a number of 
property-based theories that give rise to varying degrees of rights and 
obligations, all based on the concept of territorial sovereignty, which 
provides States the exclusive right to use the land, water, and other 
 
 29. On subglacial lakes generally, see generally HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 21, 
118, 153-57. 
 30. See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 93-122 (explaining the structure and drainage of 
glaciers). 
 31. The United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1996) (defining an 
international watercourse as “a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states). See, 
e.g., ILC, Commentary, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, ¶ 222, pt. 1, art. 2(a), commentary (2) (“The most common examples [of 
international watercourses] would be a river or stream that forms or crosses a boundary, or a 
lake through which a boundary passes.”). 
 32. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. 
 33. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, MOUNT EVEREST (2009), http://www.search.eb. 
com/eb/print?articleId=108438&fullArticle=true&tocId=9108438. 
 34. Id. 
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resources found within its borders. These theories include absolute 
territorial sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, and limited 
territorial sovereignty—all variations on the degree to which a State 
must consider the transboundary effects of its use of its water 
resources. This section explores the role of territorial sovereignty in 
international watercourse law by defining the different theoretical 
approaches that States’ have used to negotiate and argue the 
parameters of international watercourse law. It concludes that limited 
territorial sovereignty is properly seen as a move away from absolute 
territorial sovereignty, but that the core concept of territorial 
sovereignty remains influential and dominant in defining the 
parameters of international watercourse law. 
A. Absolute Territorial Sovereignty 
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty provides that 
States have exclusive sovereignty over their territory and that this 
soverignty is unfettered by the interests of any other State, meaning 
that a State may exploit natural resources situated in its territory to 
the extent desired, regardless of any transboundary consequences.35 
Perhaps the earliest, the most direct, and the most famous articulation 
of absolute territorial sovereignty is then U.S. Attorney General 
Judson Harmon’s assertion that the United States did not owe to 
Mexico a duty to desist its diversions of water from the Rio Grande 
so that Mexico could also enjoy the use of the river’s waters.36 
Harmon rooted his property argument in three tenets of 
international law. First, that States enjoy sovereignty within its 
territory is axiomatic. Second, he based his argument on a longer-
standing theory of jurisdiction that suggests that in the absence of an 
international or bilateral agreement, States are free to act in their best 
interests within their territory.37 Third, in articulating the doctrine, 
 
 35. STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 77 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2007) (defining the Harmon Doctrine). 
 36. Judson Harmon, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—International Law, 21 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 
274 (Dec. 12, 1895). The theory is also known as the Harmon Doctrine. See MCCAFFREY, 
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 77 (noting that the Harmon Doctrine is 
“virtually synonymous” with absolute territorial sovereignty). See generally id. at 76-110. 
 37. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 69 (defining 
“territoriality” and describing jurisdictional consequences); see also OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 384, § 118 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
As evidence for this theory, Harmon relied on general principles of law relating to jurisdiction, 
citing the United States Supreme Court decision Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch 
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Harmon relied on the idea that States may take action in the pursuit 
of self-preservation, though the concept of self-preservation is more 
accurately thought of as an excuse for taking a particular action 
rather than providing a right to take any action.38 
In important ways, however, these tenets are misapplied in the 
shared river context, and Harmon is not viewed as having expressed 
the customary law of the time.39 Indeed, absolute territorial 
sovereignty still does not reflect customary law.40 Perhaps most 
significant, no State prior to Harmon’s assertion had identified 
absolute territorial sovereignty as a reason or justification for 
exploiting water resources to the detriment of a downstream 
riparian.41 However, despite States’ general unwillingness to justify 
downstream implications on the grounds of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, States continue to assert their right to territorial 
sovereignty as a bedrock principle of international water law, often 
initiating negotiations and excusing participation in regional and 
bilateral agreements with reference to territorial sovereignty.42 In this 
way, even though absolute territorial sovereignty is not customary 
 
116, 136, for the proposition that States enjoyed exclusive sovereignty. In that case, the Supreme 
Court noted that 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and 
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself . . . All exceptions, 
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be 
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. 
Harmon, supra note 36, at 281-82 (citing Schooner Exchange, supra). 
 38. OPPENHEIM, supra note 37, at 426-27 (defining the concept of self-preservation). 
 39. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water, Water Everywhere, But Too Few Drops to Drink: 
The Coming Fresh Water Crisis and International Environmental Law, 28 DEN. J. INT’L. L. & 
POL’Y 325, 327 (asserting that “Harmon’s conclusions were not supported, much less compelled, 
by the law as it existed at the time”). 
 40. See generally Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: 
Buried, Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549 (1996) (arguing that the Harmon Doctrine 
should not be international law). 
 41. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 113 (suggesting 
that while often asserted, states have seldom put the idea of absolute territorial sovereignty into 
practice); Jerome Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE 
BASINS 15, 23 (Garretson et al. eds., 1967) (“Research has disclosed no evidence that the 
Harmon Doctrine was ever applied to contiguous rivers.”). In fact, years after the United States 
had staked its claim to the waters of the Rio Grande based on its assertion of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, it renounced the doctrine, suggesting that the U.S. State Department had 
considered the recitation of what is now known as the Harmon Doctrine an obtusely biased 
position statement. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of 
Transboundary Fresh Waters, 1 INT’L. J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 270 (2001) (suggesting 
that the Harmon Doctrine did not reflect State practice). 
 42. See id. at 269 (noting that upper riparian States invariably begin negotiations by taking 
note of absolute territorial sovereignty). 
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international law, it is a powerful negotiating position, and it holds 
powerful political sway in international fora. Absolute territorial 
sovereignty remains an important and influential underlying principle 
in international water law. 
B. Absolute Territorial Integrity 
The principle of absolute territorial integrity provides that an 
upstream State may not undertake an activity that would affect the 
natural flow of water to the downstream State.43 Some scholars and 
downstream States, suggest that the right to absolute territorial 
integrity provides downstream States with a veto power over the 
activities of upper riparian States, but the notion that absolute 
territorial integrity provides veto authority is generally not accepted.44 
Nonetheless, like upper riparian States, lower riparian States push 
absolute territorial integrity more as a negotiating tool than as 
customary law.45 In fact, the substantive results of negotiated 
compromises between upper and lower riparian States suggest the 
erosion of the absoluteness of both principles, bridging the schism 
with a mitigated version of both—the principle of limited territorial 
sovereignty.46 
C. Limited Territorial Sovereignty 
Limited territorial sovereignty represents the fundamental 
substantive underpinning of international water law, and, in fact, it is 
widely viewed as customary international law.47 Built on compromise 
and middle ground, it attempts to meld the rights-based theories of 
absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity into a 
holistic, integrated framework through an expression of rights 
 
 43. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 18 (relating territorial integrity to the common law 
concept of private water rights). 
 44. Id. (noting that no evidence supports the notion of territorial integrity resolving a 
dispute between coriparians, either in a tribunal or diplomatic settlement). 
 45. Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 269 (“Downstream states . . . generally open 
[negotiations] by claiming a right to the ‘absolute integrity of the watercourse.’”). 
 46. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 131-32 
(concluding that neither absolute territorial sovereignty nor absolute territorial integrity are 
truly “absolute” in practice). 
 47. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 38 (concluding, after thorough analysis of State practice, 
decisions of international panels and courts, and the writings of commentators and publicists, 
that limited territorial sovereignty “is a rule of international law”); see also MCCAFFREY, supra 
note 35, at 135 (noting that limited territorial sovereignty is “the prevailing theory of 
international watercourse rights and obligations today”). 
THORSON_FMT2.DOC 5/7/2009  2:45:26 PM 
2009] SHARING HIMALAYAN GLACIAL MELTWATER 497 
coupled with an acknowledgement of duties.48 The concept of limited 
territorial sovereignty is substantively interpreted as the right of 
territorial sovereignty and the corollary duty not to cause significant 
harm to the sovereign rights of other States.49 
While some scholars might argue that the birth of this principle 
represents a clear abdication of the principle of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, this principle hardly entirely renounces territorial 
sovereignty.50 In fact, instead of integrating the concepts of territorial 
sovereignty and integrity, articulations of limited territorial 
sovereignty merely juxtapose the right to territorial sovereignty and 
the duty to protect the territorial integrity of other States.51 It is thus 
an abdication only of the extent of the right, not the right itself.  The 
history of the law of international watercourses has evolved based on 
assertions of rights and negotiating positions, which, over time, has 
meant that expressions of rights have always subjugated the 
expression of duties—this is entirely evident in various iterations of 
“limited territorial sovereignty.”52 In most articulations of this 
principle, the right of territorial sovereignty remains influential and 
dominant, whereas the duty not to cause harm is more measured. In 
fact, it is never defined as simply the duty not to cause harm; at best, 
 
 48. See James O. Moermond III & Erickson Shirley, Critical Essay: A Survey of the 
International Law of Rivers, 16 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 139, 145 (1987-1988) (noting the 
hybrid nature of limited territorial sovereignty). 
 49. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 25 (describing early articulations of the limited territorial 
sovereignty doctrine, including France’s position in its arbitration with Spain over withdrawals 
from Lake Lanoux, wherein France asserted “the sovereignty in its own territory” but also 
recognized “the correlative duty not to injure the interests of a neighboring State”); see also 
MCCAFFREY, supra note 35, at 135 (summarizing the principle of limited territorial sovereignty 
as territorial sovereignty confined by the duty not to cause significant harm to other States). 
 50. See, e.g., Dante A. Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law: 
Principles and Institutions, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 568 (1985) (suggesting that the principles 
of reasonableness and equity, hallmark substantive beacons of limited territorial sovereignty, 
“mark the rejection” of absolute territorial sovereignty). 
 51. Although not solely applicable to freshwater resources, Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration espouses an analogous principle. Principle 21 identifies in clear terms the nature of 
the juxtaposition: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
Principle 21, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416. 
 52. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text, describing assertions of rights as 
negotiating positions, rather any acknowledgment or even allegation of duties. 
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it is articulated as the duty not to cause appreciable harm and 
sometimes even the duty not to cause significant harm.53 
Because limited territorial sovereignty softens the substantive 
impact of absolute territorial sovereignty, rather than extinguishing 
the rights inherent in the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, 
territorial sovereignty remains germane to international water law.54 
This is an important distinction for both the substance of the law and 
the scope of the law. As noted above, substantively, limited territorial 
sovereignty portends a definite deference to territorial sovereignty in 
its recognition that some level of harm to downstream States may be 
perfectly acceptable.55 Thus, while no longer “absolute,” the concept 
of territorial sovereignty remains a significant justification and basis 
for State action. In terms of scope, States’ protection of their 
territorial sovereignty is likely a limitation on implementation of 
limited territorial sovereignty because upper riparian States, out of 
concern for their sovereign and exclusive right to the water situated in 
or flowing through their territory, are resistant to consent to 
agreements wherein substantive rights and duties are based on a 
limited territorial sovereignty paradigm.56 In this way, many upper 
riparian States are not party to freshwater management agreements 
and therefore, the scope of those agreements only includes a portion 
 
 53. See G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 31, art. 7 (stating “Watercourse States shall, in 
utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to 
prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States”). When the ILC first 
presented its draft articles to the United Nations General Assembly, Article 7 was titled 
“Obligation not to cause appreciable harm.” International Law Commission, Draft Articles on 
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Draft Report of the 
International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., at 1, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.463/Add/4 
(1991). For a thorough discussion of the draft articles, see generally INTERNATIONAL WATER 
LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF CHARLES B. BOURNE (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997). 
 54. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 33 (concluding that limited territorial sovereignty requires 
that states, in exercising their sovereignty, also consider their neighbors’ concerns). 
 55. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 135 (explaining 
limited territorial sovereignty as an obligation not to cause significant harm). See Lake Lanoux 
Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 124 (Arbitral Trib. 1957) (taking note that Spain 
conceded France’s right to use water in French territory as long as it caused only a “limited 
amount of damage, a minimum of inconvenience” to Spain). 
 56. See R.R. Baxter, The Indus Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE 
BASINS 452-58 (A.H. Garreston et al. eds., 1967). During a stalemate over the development of 
the Indus River, India held strong to its belief that India and Pakistan had “full and exclusive 
jurisdiction over the management, control and utilisation of natural waters available in their 
territories. Id. at 456. It was only when the two parties agreed temporarily to put legal 
considerations aside and allow both parties to withdraw water from the river while the parties 
negotiated that the stalemate was broken. Id. at 458. 
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of the relevant watercourse.57 Thus, while limited territorial 
sovereignty may be the prevailing legal theory in the development of 
international water law,58 States’ protection of territorial sovereignty 
remains a limitation on the territorial expanse in which upper riparian 
States are willing to accept the duties flowing from a limited 
territorial sovereignty approach.59 
III. INTERNATIONAL GLACIERS AND THE SCOPE OF THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 
To ascertain whether any rights or duties exist vis-à-vis glaciers 
and their meltwater, it is first imperative to examine the status of 
glaciers in international law and thus the scope of international 
watercourse law. Throughout the last century, the law of international 
watercourses has expanded to recognize that many more freshwater 
bodies than just transboundary rivers, lakes, and aquifers are 
sufficiently interconnected to warrant status under international law. 
Thus, after a historical examination of the scope of transboundary 
water resource law, this section turns to consider the evolution of the 
concept of “watercourse” as it is currently embodied in the 1997 UN 
Convention. This section concludes that, while the Convention 
includes a broad definition of its scope, the influence of territorial 
sovereignty has meant that the 1997 UN Convention is not customary 
international law and that it is unlikely to enter into force in its own 
right. This ultimately means that the law of non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses excludes many important international 
glaciers. 
A.  Transboundary Freshwater Bodies 
Transboundary freshwater bodies—those freshwater bodies 
bisected by at least one international boundary—have long been 
exposed to the balance of rights and duties comprising international 
 
 57. See infra Part III.A. 
 58. Moermond & Erickson, supra note 48, at 145 (citing a number of scholars for the 
proposition that limited territorial sovereignty is generally accepted as international law). 
 59. See, e.g., Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin, Apr. 5, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 (China and Burma, both upper riparians, failed 
to join this agreement on the development and use of the Mekong waters) [hereinafter Mekong 
Agreement]; Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, Sudan-Egypt, 
453 U.N.T.S. 6519 (Egypt and Sudan allocated all of the waters of the Nile between themselves, 
without including the eight riparian States above them). 
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law.60 Early agreements reflect an understanding among co-riparians 
that cooperation was necessary for the most effective utilization of 
the major rivers that gave birth to early civilizations, such as the Nile 
and the Tigris-Euphrates, and the major rivers of the Himalayan 
region, such as the Indus, Yangtze, and Yellow rivers.61 But, while the 
earliest known water agreement resulted in an upstream diversion for 
agricultural purposes, controversies over non-navigational uses of 
shared water bodies arose much less frequently than disputes 
between upper and lower riparian States regarding the right to 
passage.62 Thus, agreements, disagreements, and pronouncements 
concerning the navigational uses of transboundary waters really gave 
rise to modern international water law, but the role of territorial 
sovereignty can be seen most clearly as the law evolved to include the 
non-navigational uses of transboundary waters.63 
Historical State practice regarding the navigational uses of 
shared freshwater bodies suggests that navigable rivers have long 
 
 60. See generally MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 58-64 
(providing general history of the development of bilateral and regional cooperative agreements 
regarding water resources, including for both non-navigational and navigational purposes); see 
also Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 269-73 (examining the status of shared management of 
transboundary resources as customary international law). See also id. at 34 (noting that 
“[h]istorically, and indeed until very recently, [S]tate practice in the field of international 
watercourses was concerned almost exclusively with international rivers and lakes shared by two 
or more [S]tates”); see also Gabriel Eckstein, Development of International Water Law and the 
UN Watercourse Convention, in HYDROPOLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 81-82 (Turton & Henwood eds., 2002) (highlighting that the principle 
sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedus is a longstanding principle of international water law first 
applied in cases of transboundary waters) [hereinafter Eckstein, Development of International 
Water Law). 
 61. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 58 (describing 
the nature of early civilizations to develop along major river courses and of these civilizations’ 
need to cooperate in support of agricultural development). 
 62. Id. at 181 (asserting that the demand of water resources for non-navigational purposes 
was far less controversial; instead, navigation disputes were more influential in shaping the 
nascent law of international watercourses); see also Eckstein, Development of International 
Water Law, supra note 59, at 82 (indicating that as early civilizations took root and grew, 
navigation became the dominant use of transboundary waterways and that international law on 
non-navigational uses only took shape as industrialization increased pressure on transboundary 
waterbodies). 
 63. MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 172-73 
(highlighting that the earliest agreement in a compilation of water agreements relates to 
freedom to navigate the Rhine); see also Cecil J. Olmstead, Introduction, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 3 (Garretson et al. eds., 1967) (stating that some states are 
reluctant to concede that international law is applicable to the whole of a drainage basin and 
that such reservations “probably [stem] in part from traditional notions of national 
sovereignty,” which have taken on greater significance as water value increases in the face of 
competing non-navigational uses). 
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been perceived as shared resources, subject to the navigation rights of 
all riparian States.64 Early declarations of such navigation rights have 
their basis in Roman law, which provided that rivers were public 
resources and that all citizens retained the freedom of navigation.65 
For example, when Thomas Jefferson argued that the United States 
enjoyed freedom of navigation on the lower Mississippi, parts of 
which were subject to Spanish sovereignty, he reinforced his assertion 
with a reminder of a central tenet of Roman law: that rivers are 
rooted in nature and are open to all citizens for navigation (flumina 
publica sunt, hoc est populi Romani).66 Importantly, Jefferson only 
claimed navigation rights to a clear transboundary waterbody—the 
Mississippi at that time crossed from the sovereign territory of the 
United States to the sovereign territory of Spain—and one to which 
the United States was riparian.67 Spain ultimately agreed with the 
United States and averred as such by treaty.68 
The dynamic between Spain and the United States reflects the 
historical and current understanding of co-riparian States—it is clear 
that co-riparian States, for the most part, have formed relationships 
based on an understanding that they each have a commensurate right 
to freedom of navigation of transboundary watercourses.69 The 
decision of the Permanent Court of Justice in the River Oder decision 
confirmed the nature of these relationships.70 The Court identified a 
 
 64. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 172 (describing 
early state practice). 
 65. See Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of International 
Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 46 (1991) (tracing the history of navigation and noting 
that the Roman Republic first introduced the concept of freedom of navigation). Prior to the 
Roman doctrine, riparian tribes, cities, and local rules controlled navigation, which they viewed 
as a privilege deserving of reciprocal benefit. Id. 
 66. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 181-82 (stating 
that Jefferson’s invocation of Roman law reflected the general understanding of legal scholars 
at the time). 
 67. Id. at 181. 
 68. Id. at 182. The Kingdom of Spain formally granted the United States liberty to navigate 
the Spain’s stretches of the Mississippi in Article IV of the treaty of October 27, 1975. Id. 
 69. See generally id. at 183-84 (identifying a number of bilateral and regional agreements 
following on Jefferson’s report to George Washington and a similar proclamation by the 
Provisional Executive Council of the French Republic stating that river-courses are common to 
all riparian States and therefore all riparian States enjoy inalienable freedoms vis-à-vis shared 
rivers). 
 70. The River Oder Decision resolved a dispute between Poland, on the one hand, and the 
six other members of the International Commission of the Oder over the navigational rights on 
the tributaries of the Oder. Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River 
Oder, (Czech., Den., Fr., F.R.G., Gr. Br., Swed. and Pol.) 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 5-6 
(Sept. 10). The two tributaries at issue, the Warta and Notec, rise in Poland and flow a 
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“common legal right” extending navigation rights to the whole of a 
navigable watercourse.71 
Over time, States have also come to accept that they share rights 
and duties vis-à-vis co-riparian States as a matter of customary 
international law, even as regards non-navigational uses of clear 
transboundary resources. In the Gab ikovo-Nagymoros decision, the 
International Court of Justice affirmed that Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia each had an equal right to the benefits of the 
Danube’s water resources, including the use of the water for 
hydropower, recreational enjoyment, fisheries, and other benefits, 
because the Danube lies contiguous to both Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia for a portion of its path and traverses the border of 
each.72 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that both 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia enjoyed a customary right “to an 
equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international 
watercourse.”73 Thus, the case reinforces that transboundary 
 
considerable distance through Poland, eventually crossing into Germany before joining the 
Oder in Germany. Id. at 25. Poland argued that these tributaries should be internationalized 
only “from [their] confluence with the Oder up to the Polish frontier,” retaining complete 
sovereignty over waters from those rivers within their territory. Id. at 14. The other members 
disagreed, contending that all navigable sections of the river should be internationalized, 
regardless of state boundaries. Id. The Court agreed, explaining that the purpose of 
internationalizing rivers was to provide freedom of navigation to all states, not just to riparian 
states. See id. at 28. Thus, the Court concluded that the Polish tributaries were internationalized 
as far as navigable. Id. at 29. See id. at 27 (holding that the common right of navigation extends 
to “the whole course of the river”). 
 71. The Court, by way of discussing the principle of navigation as it applied to downstream 
States seeking to navigate upstream tributaries situated wholly within sovereign territories, took 
note that: 
[W]hen consideration is given to the manner in which States have regarded the 
concrete situations arising out of the fact that a single waterway traverses or separates 
the territory of more than one State, and the possibility of fulfilling the requirements 
of justice and the considerations of utility which this fact places in relief, it is at once 
seen that a solution of the problem has been sought not in the idea of a right of passage 
in favour of upstream States, but in that of a community of interest of riparian States. 
This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal 
right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the 
use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of 
any one riparian State in relation to the others. 
Id. at 27. The International Court of Justice Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymoros project 
further develops the theory of community interest, relying on it to suggest that Czechoslovakia, 
by unilaterally acting without regard to the Danube River’s shared nature, deprived Hungary of 
its right to its share of the water resources. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 
1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 85 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter Gabčikovo-Nagymoros]. On the “community of 
interests” theory generally, see Lipper, supra note 41, at 38-40. See also MCCAFFREY, 
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 147-67. 
 72. See Gabčikovo-Nagymoros, supra note 71, at ¶ 85. 
 73. Id. ¶ 78. 
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waterbodies are subject to the rights and duties of customary 
international law. 
Transboundary lakes, rivers, and aquifers ineluctably fall within 
the scope of international law. Thus, transboundary glaciers and 
transboundary meltwater, such as glacial lakes or streams that 
traverse an international border, are direct analogues of 
transboundary rivers, lakes, and aquifers, they most likely also fall 
well within the scope of the law of international watercourses. 
Therefore, even if a specific treaty does not apply to a particular 
transboundary glacier, the customs and principles of international 
water law apply. But neither treaty practice nor international 
adjudication nor arbitration exists specifically as to glaciers, and thus 
customs and principles have not been applied in glacier-related 
contexts. Moreover, very few glaciers actually traverse international 
borders and most are less directly connected to a transboundary 
waterbody, meaning that the more salient concern is whether 
international water law also encapsulates all physically 
interconnected waters and water sources. 
B.  Beyond a Transboundary Approach? 
The notion that transboundary waterbodies are international 
resources, to which co-riparian States each have rights and duties is 
widely accepted.74 However, questions remain, given concerns about 
territorial sovereignty, whether the scope of international law 
includes non-navigational uses of sovereign tributaries of 
international waterbodies and, more importantly, sub-tributaries and 
other less directly connected elements of a water system. The arbitral 
decision in the Lac Lanoux makes clear that international water law 
does consider hydrologic relationships and that this understanding 
has been folded into the scope of international watercourse law 
because the case concerns diversions from a lake wholly within 
 
 74. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) lists over 2,000 
international legal instruments relating to water resources, mostly in the form of bilateral 
agreements. MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 62. Based on 
member states’ responses to the Secretary General’s questionnaire regarding the laws and 
legislation in force in member states, the Secretary General noted that many of the national 
laws treated water as a “natural resource which should be utilized for the common good.” The 
Secretary General, Supplementary Report Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
General Assembly Resolution 2669 (XXV), Legal Problems Relating to the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/274 (1974), reprinted in [1974] 1(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 265, 
272, ¶ 13. 
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France’s territory but that feeds rivers traveling through Spain.75 What 
is less clear is the extent of this understanding, or rather the extent to 
which water resources that lie wholly within the sovereign territory of 
one State are subject to international law when the 
interconnectedness is more attenuated than an immediate physical 
relationship to some transboundary freshwater resource.76 
1. The Lac Lanoux Arbitration 
The Lac Lanoux arbitration is the starting point for examining 
the status of sovereign waterbodies interconnected to international 
river systems. Lac Lanoux is situated entirely within the borders of 
France in the Eastern Pyrenees.77 The lake feeds two river basins, one 
that drains into Spain by way of the Font-Vivre and Carol rivers and 
one that travels through France via the Ariège and Garonne rivers.78 
In 1950, France proposed to divert water from Lac Lanoux for the 
purpose of generating hydropower.79 Spain took offense to this 
because it would affect the flow of the Carol river, which crosses the 
border from France into Spain.80 After some negotiation, France 
agreed that it would replenish water to the Carol via a manmade 
diversion, thus ensuring that the flow of the Carol remained 
consistent with historical levels.81 Nonetheless, Spain opposed any 
diversion on the grounds that it would “modif[y] the natural 
conditions of the hydrographic basin”82 and, relatedly, that France 
could not undertake such a project without arranging a prior 
agreement with Spain.83 
 
 75. Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 55, at 101-02. For a discussion of that Arbitration, 
see infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., Comments and Observations Received from Governments: General 
Comments of Costa Rica, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
in documents of its forty-fifth session, [1993] II (1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 145, 151, ¶ 9, U.N. 
DOC. A/CN.4/447 and Add.1-3 (questioning whether “the circumstance of [a river] crossing a 
small part of the territory of a neighbouring State and flowing into its waters [would] be 
sufficient to qualify that entire river or tributary as an ‘international watercourse’”). 
 77. Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 55, at 101. 
 78. Id. at 101-02. 
 79. See id. at 107. The subject of diverting waters from Lac Lanoux first arose in 1917, and 
was the subject of dialogue between Spain and France until 1930, when world events took 
precedence. In 1949, the two countries renewed their dialogue; in 1950, a French hydropower 
company applied for, and was granted, a concession from the French Government to divert 
waters from Lac Lanoux to the River Ariege. Id. at 105-07. 
 80. Id. at 112. 
 81. Id. at 109-10. 
 82. Id. at 124. 
 83. Id. at 113-14. 
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In addressing these issues, the arbitral tribunal implicitly spoke 
to the extent of international water law. The panel recognized, by way 
of background, prior to arriving at any substantive conclusions, that 
the waters of Lac Lanoux, though wholly situated within the 
sovereign territory of France, are nonetheless an element of an 
international water system because of the interconnectedness of the 
lake and at least one transboundary river system.84 The panel pointed 
out that “there is a rule prohibiting the upper riparian State from 
altering the waters of a river in circumstances calculated to do serious 
injury to the lower riparian State.”85 By so stating, the Panel 
confirmed that the customary international water law regarding non-
navigational uses includes within its scope lakes and other 
waterbodies that, though wholly situated within a sovereign territory, 
feed an international watercourse.86 
In this regard, the arbitral panel made no distinction among 
waterbodies directly connected to transboundary rivers and those that 
are less directly connected, but the facts of the dispute did not cause 
the panel to delve any deeper into the matter of the scope of 
international law.87 To say that this decision wholly endorses a water-
system approach is an overstatement, but it does begin to lay the 
groundwork for a broader approach to international water law.88 In 
fact, following this decision, the International Law Association, took 
up codification and development of the law of international water 
resources and promoted a drainage basin approach to defining the 
scope of international water law. 
2. The Helsinki Rules 
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International 
Rivers, adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) in 1966 
 
 84. Id. at 125 (“The Tribunal does not overlook the reality, from the point of view of 
physical geography, of each river basin, which constitutes . . . a ‘unit.’”). 
 85. Id. at 129. 
 86. See John G. Laylin & Rinaldo L. Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in the International 
River Disputes, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 30, 43-45 (1959) (explaining the Tribunal’s decision to limit 
France’s sovereignty over international rivers and lakes in certain instances). 
 87. See J.G. LAMMERS, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 516-17 (1984) 
(noting that the Tribunal simply applied the principle of good neighborliness to the riparian 
context). 
 88. “The unity of a basin is sanctioned at the juridical level only to the extent that it 
corresponds to human realities.” Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 55, at 125. See Samuel A. 
Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25-27 
(1972) (noting that although France prevailed, it did not have unfettered discretion in its use of 
waters from Lake Lanoux). 
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as one of the earliest attempts at codifying the emerging international 
law governing the uses of transboundary rivers, identifies the rules 
pertaining to “international drainage basins.”89 An international 
drainage basin is more than simply a transboundary river, it is the 
entire geographic area of a watershed.90 The definition identifies the 
limits of any given watershed as a water system, comprising both the 
surface and ground waters and co-terminating at a single point of 
outflow.91 The rules thus contemplate a broad understanding of the 
freshwater resources subject to international water law. In fact, under 
this theory, even a wholly sovereign tributary to a transboundary 
river attains international status despite it lacking a transboundary 
nature of its own.92 Or, a domestic lake, if interconnected through 
surface waters or even groundwaters to a watershed spanning an 
international border, falls within the purview of international law as 
 
 89. International Law Association, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers, 52 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 484, 484 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules]. The Helsinki 
Rules have been superseded by the Berlin Rules, adopted in 2004, but the Helsinki Rules 
remain the more authoritative and widely recognized set of rules. International Law 
Association, Berlin Rules on Water Resources, 71 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 334, 343 (2004), 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/B6F3AD1C-11B5-45A389534097AD1FE 
E95. 
 90. Helsinki Rules, supra note 89, art. 2 cmt. b at 485 (elaborating on the elements of a 
basin). 
 91. Art. 2 provides that “[a]n international drainage basin is a geographical area extending 
over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including 
surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus.” Id. at 484-85. See Stephen 
C. McCaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water Problems, 31 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 141-44 (1991) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Holistic Approach] (explaining 
the scope of an international drainage basin); Teclaff, supra note 65 at 68-69 (briefly discussing 
the foundation of the Helsinki Rules); Gabriel Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the 
Status of Ground Water Resources Under the UN Watercourse Convention, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL 
L. 525, 533-35 (2005) (acknowledging that some countries objected to the breadth of the term 
drainage basin and it was ultimately not incorporated in the 1997 UN Convention). See also 
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures of Water Management Needed to Fulfill 
the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, 7 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 63, 80 (1992-1994) 
(noting that the Helsinki Rules, while significant, have only persuasive value in international 
law); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh Waters, 
1 INT.’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 273-74 (2001) (commenting on the remarkable influence 
of the ILA as a non-governmental organization). 
 92. Helsinki Rules, supra note 89, art. 3 cmt. at 486 (including in its definition of basin state 
“all States whose territories contribute waters to the international drainage basin, whether or 
not ‘riparian’”). See McCaffrey, Holistic Approach, supra note 91, at 143 (“[T]he rules of 
international law stated by the Helsinki Rules apply not only to the main stem of a river, or to 
portions of a stream forming a boundary, but to tributaries of an international watercourse as 
well.”). 
THORSON_FMT2.DOC 5/7/2009  2:45:26 PM 
2009] SHARING HIMALAYAN GLACIAL MELTWATER 507 
articulated by the ILA.93 In either case, according to the Helsinki 
rules, any interconnected fresh water composing the drainage basin, 
no matter how far removed from a transboundary resource, is subject 
to international water law. 
3. The 1997 United Nations Convention on Non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses 
While the ILA conducted its work, the International Law 
Commission (ILC), established in 1948 by the United Nations 
Charter and charged with the codification and progressive 
development of international law, embarked on a mission to codify 
the law of international rivers.94 This effort, initiated in 1970, 
culminated in the 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (1997 UN Convention).95  While most of 
the Convention’s substantive prescriptions are considered customary 
international law, the scope of the Convention remains highly 
contentious, in large part as a result of upper riparian States’ 
reluctance to cede any sovereignty to the interests of lower riparian 
States.96 
Turkey expressed the sentiment and fears of upper riparian 
States when, during the debate of the draft articles at the UN General 
Assembly, it stated that “the term ‘watercourse system’ has also been 
 
 93. Helsinki Rules, supra note 89, art. 3 cmt. at 486 (“recogni[zing] . . . that underground 
waters may flow from a State without reaching the surface in its territory into the territory of 
other States in an international drainage basin where they contribute substantially to the surface 
flow”). 
 94. Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations provides the authority for the 
United Nations General Assembly to convene a Commission dedicated to the codification and 
progression of international law. See U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1a. The United Nations General 
Assembly convened the Commission on December 11, 1946 during the second half of its first 
meeting. See G.A. Res. 94(I), at 187 (Dec. 11, 1946), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/ 
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/45/IMG/NR003345.pdf?OpenElement. The Commission 
comprises 34 international law scholars, serving five-year terms. See United Nations, 
International Law Commission, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
 95. United Nations, Resolution 2669 (XXV) (Dec. 8, 1970) (providing terms of reference 
for Commission’s study of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses), 
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/349/34/IMG/NR034934. 
pdf?OpenElement (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). The ILC produced a set of draft Articles in 1991 
and a second draft in 1994, after which the General Assembly instructed the Commission to pull 
together a draft convention for the member governments’ consideration. Draft Articles, supra 
note 53; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the 46th Meeting of the International Law Commission, 
UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994); United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Use of 
International Watercourses, UN Doc. No. A. 51/869 (May 21, 1997). 
 96. See infra Part III.C. 
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given too broad a meaning. This term includes glaciers, canals and, 
especially, underground waters, and naturally leads to the sharing of 
these resources.” 97 Turkey posited that defining the scope of the 
treaty so broadly would unacceptably infringe the permanent 
sovereignty that States retain over the natural resources situated 
within their territory.98 Despite States’ objections, the ILC 
nonetheless moved forward with a broad definition, though it did 
reject the ILA’s drainage basin approach.99 
 
 97. Comments and Observations Received from Governments: General Comments of 
Turkey, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, in documents of 
its forty-fifth session, [1993] II (1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 145, 168, ¶ 5, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/447 
and Add.1-3 [hereinafter Comments of Turkey]. The debate over the proper definition of an 
international watercourse extended over two and a half decades. See James L. Wescoat, Jr., 
Beyond the River Basin: The Changing Geography of International Water Problems and 
International Watercourse Law, 3 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 301, 304 (1992) (tracing the 
evolution of the term “watercourse” in the 1997 UN Convention). 
 98. In discussions over the scope of waters included in the 1997 U.N. Convention, Turkey 
expressed its preference for a narrow scope, arguing that otherwise the result “would be 
inconsistent with the generally accepted principle of international law concerning the 
permanent sovereignty of States over their own natural resources.” Turkey further stated that it 
would only give its approval if the scope of the draft articles was limited in scope to surface 
waters. See Comments of Turkey, supra note 97, at 168, ¶ 5. 
 99. The contentious nature of defining the scope of the Convention is evidenced by the fact 
that the ILC took up the scope as one of its last items, after nearly 23 years of debate. See 
Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, Seventh Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/436/Corr. 1-3 (Mar. 15, 1991); see also 
McCaffrey, Holistic Approach, supra note 91, at 153 (noting that the general lack of agreement 
regarding the definition of the term “watercourse” forestalled further pursuit of the matter at 
the outset of the ILC’s work). For a discussion of the ILC’s work on the scope of the 
Convention, see Margaret J. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty: A Discussion of the 
ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. 
& DEV. L. J. 191, 196-97 (2008). In 1980, the ILC agreed to a framework understanding of 
“watercourse” based on the idea that each watercourse is a system of interconnected waters and 
provided the following explanation of its understanding: 
A watercourse system is formed of hydrographic components such as rivers, lakes, 
canals, glaciers, and groundwater constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a 
unitary whole; thus, any use affecting waters in one part of the system may affect 
waters in another part. 
An “international watercourse system” is a watercourse system, components of which 
are situated in two or more States. 
To the extent that parts of the waters in one State are not affected by or so not affect 
uses of waters in another State, they shall not be treated as being included in the 
international watercourse system. Thus, to the extent that the uses of the waters of the 
system have an effect on one another, to that extent the system in international, but 
only to that extent; accordingly, there is not an absolute, but a relative, international 
character of the watercourse. 
International Law Commission, Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.316 (July 17, 1980), available at http:// untreaty.un.org/ 
ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_1316.pdf. 
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Despite the ILC’s rejection of the ILA’s use of “drainage basin” 
to define “watercourse,” the ILC still conceptually rejected the 
international river as forming the sole basis of the international law of 
watercourses.100 The 1997 UN Convention defines “watercourse” 
functionally the same as the ILA, stating that a watercourse is a 
system of surface and groundwaters that are physically 
interconnected and that usually co-terminate.101 Significantly, the 1997 
UN Convention defines an international watercourse as “a 
watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.”102 
This definition is broad and encompasses all interconnected 
waters, including rivers, tributaries, lakes, glaciers, aquifers, 
reservoirs, and canals.103 An international watercourse exists when 
any portion, whether a tributary, lake, or other surface waterbody 
receives water from or contributes water to another State.104 Mountain 
glaciers indisputably function as part of a water system when they 
supply rivers, lakes, and aquifers with water, and thus, these glaciers 
are encapsulated by the broad definition espoused by the 1997 UN 
Convention. Consequently, if a mountain glacier is physically 
connected to a water system that meets the requirements of the 1997 
UN Convention, then certain rights and duties would apply to the use 
 
 100. Many upper riparian States favored the “international river” approach taken in the 
Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which would have limited the scope of the ILC’s 
work to rivers that either separate or traverse at least two States. See McCaffrey, Holistic 
Approach, supra note 91, at 152 (analyzing the responses of governments to a questionnaire on 
setting the scope of the ILC’s work). 
 101. See 1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 2(a) (“‘Watercourse’ means a system of 
surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary 
whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.”); see also MCCAFFREY, 
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that the distinction between an 
international drainage basin and a watercourse system, at least legally, is merely of historical 
interest because “the concept of the drainage basin is functionally equivalent—at least 
hydrologically—to that of the watercourse system”). 
 102. See 1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 2(b) (“‘International watercourse’ means 
a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.”). 
 103. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 35 (pointing out 
that “watercourse” as defined by the International Law Commission in the 1997 UN 
Convention includes “rivers and their tributaries, lakes, aquifers, glaciers, reservoirs and 
canals”). One of the Special Rapporteurs appointed by the International Law Commission, 
Stephen McCaffrey has stated in remarks, “[The 1997 UN Convention’s definition of 
“watercourse”] covers not only the boundary river or successive river, but also lakes and other 
surface waters that may be shared. It applies to a tributary or any other component or 
subtributaries that may be involved.” Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (Remarks), 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 228, 233 (1990). 
 104. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 41. 
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of that glacier.105 This is true whether the glacier itself is 
transboundary or whether it resides solely in sovereign territory. 
C. The Watercourse Approach as Customary International Law 
The 1997 UN Convention proffers an expansive scope of 
applicability—one that likely provides downstream States rights vis-à-
vis glacial meltwater stored in upstream States, but these rights are 
only salient if either the Convention enters into force and all relevant 
States are party or the Convention’s expansive watercourse approach 
represents customary international law.106 While many of the 
substantive provisions of the Convention are likely considered 
customary law, upper riparian States have a good argument for the 
claim that the scope of the customary law of international 
watercourses is not as geographically and hydrologically inclusive in 
its breadth as the 1997 UN Convention.107 At the very least, many 
upper riparian States, especially China, may argue that they are 
persistent objectors and that, therefore, if the 1997 UN Convention’s 
watercourse approach is customary law, it does not apply to them.  
This section examines these arguments, focusing particularly on State 
practice in the Himalayan region. 
State reaction to the 1997 UN Convention is evidence of State 
practice, and, generally, upper riparian States reacted negatively to 
adoption of the Convention. In fact, few States have ratified the 
treaty, and far fewer have ratified than is needed for it to enter into 
force—only sixteen States have submitted their ratifications, and the 
treaty requires thirty-five ratifications to enter into force.108 Although 
a number of upper riparian States have ratified the treaty, these 
 
 105. These rights and duties include equitable and reasonable utilization and participation, 
1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 5, obligation not to cause significant harm, id. art. 7, 
and information exchange and notification, id. art. 9-19. 
 106. See BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 30 (2005) 
(explaining the complementary nature of customary law and treaty law). 
 107. See infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text. 
 108. See 1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 36(1) (“The present Convention shall 
enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.”); United Nations Treaty Collection, Databases, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with 
the Secretary-General, Status of Treaties, Chapter XXVII(12), http://treaties.un.org/ Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=530&chapter=27&lang=en#1 (indicating that sixteen 
States have signed the Convention and sixteen have ratified it) (last visited Feb. 10, 2009) 
[hereinafter UNTC Database]. Those States that have ratified the Convention are Finland, 
Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Namibia, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, and Uzbekistan. Id. 
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States are also all lower riparian States with respect to major rivers.109 
Of these, only two primarily upper riparian States have ratified the 
treaty—South Africa and Uzbekistan, both of which have 
considerable interests to protect as lower riparian States as well.110 
None of the Himalayan States have signed or ratified the treaty.111 
Moreover, many States, including India and Pakistan, abstained from 
voting on the Convention during the General Assembly debate, 
evincing suspicion and general disregard of the treaty.112 Many of the 
States that abstained are upper riparian States.113 Three States voted 
against it—again, all upper riparian States in major international river 
basins and, importantly, China was one of these States.114 In addition, 
prior to drafting the treaty, the ILC surveyed governments as to 
whether it should use a drainage basin concept to identify the scope 
of the treaty.115 Of the upriver or upper riparian States that 
responded, most eschewed the drainage basin concept, favoring 
instead the concept of “international river.”116 On the other hand, 
lower riparian States responded mostly favorably to a drainage basin 
concept.117 This schism in responses and the low ratification yield of 
 
 109. See UNTC Database, supra note 108; Eckstein, Development of International Water 
Law, supra note 59, at 91-96 (detailing states’ status as either upper or lower riparian or both). 
 110. See Eckstein, Development of International Water Law, supra note 59, at 93, 94 (noting 
that South Africa and Uzbekistan are mostly upper riparian States); see also Central 
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Uzbekistan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/uz.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (showing map of Uzbekistan’s two 
major rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, which originate in Tajikistan and Kyrgystan 
respectively); Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Irrigation Potential in 
Africa: A Basin Approach (1997), http://www.fao.org/docrep/W4347E/w4347e0q.htm (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2009) (identifying Lesotho as the upper Riparian State vis-à-vis the Orange 
River). 
 111. UNTC Database, supra note 108. 
 112. UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1997, at 1343 (1997). Nepal 
and Bangladesh voted in favor of the Convention. Id. 
 113. See Eckstein, Development of International Water Law, supra note 60, at 91-96 
(identifying upper versus lower riparian States voting in favor and abstaining from the vote to 
adopt the Convention). 
 114. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 111. 
 115. When the ILC began its deliberations, it started by circulating a questionnaire to 
member States inquiring whether it should employ the ILA’s drainage basin concept as a 
parameter for its work. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.l (1974), reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 302, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l.; see also McCaffrey, International Organizations, supra note 
91, at 151-52 (detailing the history of the ILC’s work). 
 116. Of the twenty-five States that originally responded to the questionnaire, half expressed 
opposition to incorporation of the international drainage basin concept, leading the Special 
Rapporteur to eschew that terminology. Id. at 152. 
 117. Id. 
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the treaty suggests that the watercourse approach is not widely 
accepted and that it is not customary international law. 
State practice in the Himalayan region further supports upper 
riparian States’ arguments that the glaciers are not subject to the 
rights and duties of international watercourse law.118 Of the 
agreements that pertain to the waters of the region, only two manage 
river basins in any sort of comprehensive way; however, even these 
agreements underscore the role of territorial sovereignty.119 The 
Mekong River Agreement defines its scope expansively, relying on an 
ecosystem approach, but China, wherein the headwaters of the 
Mekong originate, refuses to ratify the agreement and only 
participates in management negotiations and problem-solving as an 
observer.120 The Indus River Agreement between Pakistan and India 
also identifies a broad scope of application including all tributaries 
and all connecting lakes of the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, 
and Sutlej Rivers, but the substantive provisions of the treaty apply 
variously to different tributaries and all tributaries that originate in 
Pakistan and flow only through Pakistani territory are excluded from 
any substantive impact.121 
 
 118. This section takes a particular look at state practice in the Himalayan region for two 
reasons: This Article is specifically concerned with the glaciers and glacial meltwater 
distribution of the Himalayan region, and ascertaining the customary law as it pertains to 
glaciers requires an examination of state practice vis-à-vis glaciers—the Himalayan region 
represents the most significant multi-State, glacier dependent region. 
 119. See Indus Waters Treaty, Sep. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126, (including in its scope all 
tributaries that eventually join the main river, even if they flow only intermittently); Mekong 
Agreement, supra note 59 (addressing not just the water but also the surrounding environment). 
See also Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges’ Waters, Bangl.-India, Nov. 5, 1977, 1066 
U.N.T.S. 16 (regulating the waters of the Ganges at Farrakka Barrage, just east of the India-
Bangladesh border); Amended Agreement Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and 
the Government of India on the Kosi Project, India-Nepal, Dec. 19, 1966, reprinted in Subedi, 
supra note 5, at 253 (agreeing to construct a hydroelectric dam for mutual benefit and adjusting 
the water allocation accordingly); Agreement Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and 
the Government of India on the Gandak Irrigation and Power Project, India-Nepal, Dec. 4, 
1959, reprinted in Subedi, supra note 5, at 262 (cooperatively managing the construction and use 
of a dam on the Gandak River); Treaty between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the 
Government of India concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River, India-
Nepal, Feb. 12, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 531, reprinted in Subedi, supra note 5, at 267 (allocating water 
between Nepal and India on the Mahakali River). 
 120. Mekong Agreement, supra note 59. For a discussion of China’s interests in the Mekong 
River, see L. Waldron Davis, Reversing the Flow: International Law and Chinese Hydropower 
Development on the Headwaters of the Mekong River, 19 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 121. See generally Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 119. The Indus Waters Treaty is the 
upshot of long negotiations among India, Pakistan, and the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development. For more on the political history of the negotiations, see 
Baxter, supra note 57. 
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Thus, although some precedent exists for managing rivers and 
interconnected waters, the majority of the agreements in the region 
are simply agreements for the construction and running of dams in 
the context of a singular international river—evidence that the States 
in the region do not see themselves as legally obliged to multilaterally 
manage entire water systems, including glaciers, as single entities.122 
This assertion is buttressed by the fact that no State in the region has 
ratified any regional or bilateral water agreements since the adoption 
of the 1997 UN Convention.123 In addition, China has roundly refused 
to ratify any water agreements, whether bilateral, regional, or 
international.124 
Moreover, that the responses to the 1997 UN Convention, as well 
as State treaty practice, split so clearly along lower riparian versus 
upper riparian lines is meaningful. It evinces a strong underlying 
current of territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity.  No State 
that has within it valuable natural resources wants to subsume its 
liberty to act according to its best interest to the interest of any other 
State that may be affected. Thus, while limited territorial sovereignty 
may be the prevailing substantive theory, it has never been applied 
comprehensively to an entire physically interconnected water 
system—either because upper riparian States declined to enter into 
comprehensive management regimes or because the agreements that 
do bring upper riparian States to the table include compromises and 
major concessions to upper riparian States’ interests, usually by 
limiting the geographic scope of the agreement. Generally, upper 
riparian States disfavor internationalizing freshwater resources 
outside of a limited radius of a transboundary waterbody, and, in this 
way, territorial sovereignty remains the dominant limiting factor in 
defining the scope of international water law. 
 
 122. See Subedi, supra note 5, at 248 (“Unlike the regional or sub-regional arrangements 
that exist in other parts of the world with regard to the shared international watercourses of the 
region, there is no sub-regional, regional or basin-wide approach adopted in these treaties to the 
broader water or environmental problems facing [India, Nepal, and Bangladesh].”). 
 123. The Mekong Agreement is the most recent, entering into force in 1995. See Mekong 
River Commission Secretariat, Mekong River Commission, http://www.mrcmekong.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2009) (detailing history of the Commission). 
 124. See Alex Liebman, Trickle-down Hegemony? China’s “Peaceful Rise” and Dam 
Building on the Mekong, 27 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 281, 290, 299 (2005) (concluding that 
China’s costs are many upon signing water management agreements with lower riparian States); 
Eric W. Sievers, Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse Law: China, Kazakhstan, and the 
Irtysh, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 31 (2002) (noting that despite repeated efforts by Russia and 
Kazakhstan to compose a general agreement of cooperation on the Irtysh River, China failed to 
sign). 
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CONCLUSION: GLACIERS IN CONTEXT 
This approach is problematic when it is applied to glaciers. While 
some glaciers, such as the Siachen glacier that traverses both India 
and Pakistan, are transboundary in the most straightforward sense of 
term, other glaciers are wholly within sovereign territories but 
nonetheless international because of some physical 
interconnectedness to a transboundary freshwater resource. 
Moreover, many glaciers connected to watersheds feed headwaters of 
rivers that are connected only distantly from a mainstem water 
resource. These glaciers are not clearly subject to the law of 
international watercourses. They would be if the 1997 UN 
Convention actually reflected customary international law, but State 
practice does not seem to support the 1997 UN Convention’s 
approach to the scope of international watercourse law. 
As such, States may argue forcefully, based on territorial 
sovereignty, that many international glaciers are not subject to the 
customary law of international watercourses and will rely on this 
argument to forestall regional and bilateral agreements that promote 
cooperative sharing and distribution of the waters’ benefits based on 
parity and comity. If States, such as China, are not clearly the subject 
of a set of rights and duties designed to foster cooperation, then in the 
absence of agreements otherwise, such States, are likely to 
aggressively exploit glacial meltwater and arguably are not subject to 
a duty to share or cooperate in the exploitation of the these glaciers’ 
meltwater. 
In this way, water justice in the Himalayan region requires a new 
way of thinking about shared water resources. The current model, 
reflected in State practice and reluctance to endorse the 1997 UN 
Convention’s broad definition of “watercourse,” is inadequate to 
foster true water accord in the region. 
 
